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METHODS AND SEVERITY: THE TWO TRACKS OF SECTION 12
Lisa Kerr and Benjamin L. Berger*
The story of section 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which
protects against cruel and unusual treatment or punishment,1 is
overwhelmingly told — by judges and scholars alike — as a tale about
proportionality. This is an artefact of the prominence of one problem that
Canadian courts have famously employed a muscular approach to s 12 to
address: the problem of mandatory minimum sentences. Since Nur,2 the
analytical path for evaluating the constitutionality of mandatory minimum
sentences has been firmly and clearly set.3 In Lloyd, the Court summarized
the jurisprudence: “The question, put simply, is this: In view of the fit and
proportionate sentence, is the mandatory minimum sentence grossly
disproportionate to the offence and its circumstances? If so, the provision
violates s. 12.”4 In this article we argue that this focus on comparison and
proportionality as the analytic heart of cruel and unusual treatment and
punishment blurs a crucial distinction within s 12, and thereby enervates
the courts’ capacity to respond to the range of wrongs that the section
should be able to address.
When judges describe the evil at which s 12 is directed, they use a
welter of phrases. Section 12 prohibits state treatment or punishment that
is “abhorrent or intolerable”; “incompatible with human dignity”; or “so

Lisa Kerr is an Assistant Professor at Queen’s University, Faculty of Law. Benjamin L.
Berger is a Professor and York Research Chair in Pluralism and Public Law at Osgoode
Hall Law School, York University. We are grateful for the excellent feedback we received
on a draft of this article from participants at both the Queen’s-uOttawa Public Law
Workshop and the Osgoode Hall Constitutional Cases Conference, from Palma Paciocco,
and from Paul Quick at the Queen’s Prison Law Clinic.
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Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [ “Charter”].
1

2

R. v Nur, 2015 SCC 15 [Nur].

For the Court’s most recent description of the test, see R v Boudreault, 2018 SCC 58 at
para 46 [Boudreault].
3

4

R v Lloyd, 2016 SCC 13, at para 23 [Lloyd].
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excessive as to outrage standards of decency”.5 When read within the world
of the mandatory minimum sentence jurisprudence, it is natural enough
that these phrases are generally taken to be synonymous with gross
disproportionality. Grossly disproportionate treatment or punishment is,
indeed, cruel and unusual and that’s what’s wrong with mandatory
minimums. However, this equation of the essential wrong addressed by s
12 with the particular analytical approach appropriate to assessing the
constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences obscures the
important fact that two distinct species of wrongful state punishment can
offend standards of decency, be abhorrent or intolerable to society, or
violate human dignity. Otherwise put, there are two routes — two tracks —
by which one can arrive at the fundamental wrong at the heart of s 12. The
state can run afoul of s 12 by punishing excessively (the “severity track”) or
by using intrinsically unacceptable methods of treatment or punishment
(the “methods track”). Importantly, each demands a distinct method of
analysis from reviewing courts. To date, this distinction, and its
implications for s 12 analysis, has gone unrecognized in the caselaw and
scholarship alike.6
Indeed, evidence of the blurring of this crucial distinction, and its
analytic consequences, can be found in the Court’s most recent decision on
s 12, R v Boudreault.7 As we discuss below, at certain key argumentative
points in the decision, the dissent and majority speak past one another
because, at these points, they are moving on different s 12 tracks. In
particular, when Côté J, writing in dissent, notes that the victim fine
surcharge is quite unlike “the lash, the lobotomisation of certain dangerous
offenders, and the castration of sexual offenders”8, she introduces reasoning
Lloyd, id., at para. 24 (S.C.C.); R. v. Morrisey, [2000] S.C.J. No. 39, 2000 SCC 39, at
para. 26 (S.C.C.) [Morrisey]; R. v. Smith, [1987] S.C.J. No. 36, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045, at
1072 (S.C.C.) [Smith]; and R. v Ferguson, [2008] S.C.J. No. 6, 2008 SCC 6, at para. 14
(S.C.C.). Canadian judges have also often repeated that demonstrating a breach of s. 12 is
“a high bar.” Lloyd, id., at para. 24; Steele v. Mountain Institution, [1990] S.C.J. No. 111,
[1990] 2 S.C.R. 1385, at 1417 (S.C.C.).
5

Debra Parkes implicitly distinguishes between these tracks in “The Punishment Agenda
in the Courts,” (2014) S.C.L.R. (2d) 589 [hereinafter “Parkes”]. While Parkes doesn’t go
so far as to argue that the two tracks should attract different tests, she separates prison
condition cases from cases concerning mandatory minimums, and refers to the latter as
“[a] dominant strand in the section 12 case law” Id., at 590.
6

7

Boudreault, supra, note 3.

Boudreault, supra, note 3, at para. 183. Côté J.’s citation traces back to the 1987 Smith
decision. See Smith, supra, note 5, at 1073-74.
8

-2Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3466354

Not a final version – Forthcoming (2019) in The Supreme Court Law Review (2d)

about intrinsically objectionable methods into a case that is properly about
severity of punishment. In so doing, aspects of her reasons present certain
of the analytic risks that arise when these two tracks are not distinguished.9
Boudreault thus served as the provocation for this piece in which we insist
on the importance of distinguishing the two tracks of s 12, even as our core
motivation for so doing is forward looking. Drawing this distinction,
delineating the distinctive nature of the mischief with which each track is
concerned, and understanding the questions and analysis appropriate to
each, are essential to ensuring that judges are equipped to deal well with the
variety of forms of s 12 claims coming before the courts.
The plan for this paper is as follows: Part 1 explains the distinction
between the two tracks in more detail, touching on why only one is welldeveloped in Canada. Part 2 makes the case for why drawing this distinction
matters, by describing two of the analytic problems that flow from our
current failure to distinguish between the two tracks of s 12. In this part, we
demonstrate the importance of selecting the right track through discussion
of three examples: the Boudreault decision; the constitutionality of s 745.1
of the Criminal Code, which introduces the possibility of life sentences
without the possibility of parole; and the assessment of prison conditions
pursuant to s 12. Part 3 then puts the distinction, and its implications, on
display through examination of another pressing jurisprudential issue: how
to distinguish between and apply the two tracks to the specific topic of
solitary confinement. Conceptual confusion has caused problems here in
recent years, as Canadian courts have reflexively imported the severity
frame generated in mandatory minimum sentence cases to resolve
complaints that are not, at core, about proportionality. Finally, Part 4
addresses a question that is a consequence of our argument: does
distinguishing between the two tracks assign prison conditions as relevant
only to the method track? Our answer is “no.” Consistent with arguments
we have developed separately in other pieces, the qualitative dimensions of
imprisonment should be understood as bearing directly on the character of
a sentence and, as such have a role to play in a gross disproportionality
analysis concerned with the severity of punishment.
1.

Understanding the Two Tracks

As we discuss more fully below, Côté J also gives considerable attention to the question
of the severity and proportionality of the surcharge, differing from the majority in how
she assesses the scheme and its effects on offenders. Thus, she discusses both tracks, but
without attending to the differences between them and without making clear that the case
at bar is about severity rather than an objectionable method.
9

-3Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3466354

Not a final version – Forthcoming (2019) in The Supreme Court Law Review (2d)

However uncultivated in the subsequent jurisprudence, one can find
the seeds of the idea that there are two distinct tracks within s 12 in the first
major Charter decision interpreting and applying the section, R v Smith.
Justice Lamer’s (as he then was) decision in Smith was attuned to the two
species of concern that we point to here, though his opinion did not
distinguish between them as sharply as we seek to here. Justice Lamer held
that a sentence that is “grossly disproportionate to what the offender
deserves”10 would run afoul of s 12. Thus, if having considered “the gravity
of the offence, the personal characteristics of the offender and the particular
circumstances of the case,”11 a court concludes that the sentence would be
“grossly disproportionate to what would have been appropriate, then it
infringes s. 12.”12 In this, he anticipated the main line of the s 12
jurisprudence in the years that followed.
Yet Justice Lamer also made clear that the ultimate concern under s
12 is “the effect of the sentence actually imposed.”13
Yes, the
unconstitutional effect of a sentence could be the product of “its length
alone,” but Lamer J was careful to recognize that “[t]he effect of the
sentence is often a composite of many factors and is not limited to the
quantum or duration of the sentence but includes its nature and the
conditions under which it is applied.”14 We see here an acknowledgement
that conditions of punishment may matter in the evaluation of the
proportionality of a sentence — a point to which we return at the end of this
paper. But Lamer J goes further, acknowledging that the method of
punishment alone can drive the result under s 12. Some forms of
punishment or treatment “will always be grossly disproportionate and will
always outrage our standards of decency”.15 They will offend s 12 “by their
very nature.”16
Justice Lamer clearly understood the distinct concerns that can arise
on each track. The severity of a sanction might exceed what is appropriate,
in light of all of the circumstances, or it might be a sanction that, in its
10

Smith, supra, note 5, at 1073.

11

Id., at 1073.

12

Id., at 1073.

13

Id., at 1073.

14

Id., at 1073.

15

Id., at 1073-74.

16

Id., at 1073.
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nature, offends our sense of decency and thus violates limits on state action
in the penal realm. Both concerns may well be present, but they are not
both required so as to find an infringement of s 12, nor do they call for the
same sets of considerations and questions from a court. They are
alternatives. It is this feature of Lamer J.’s first pass at s 12 interpretation
that we seek to recover and explore in this article. We argue that that the
clarity and rationality of this area of law would be improved, and the distinct
harms recognized in Smith better protected, if we more clearly distinguish
the two tracks of s 12 jurisprudence and the analytic method appropriate to
each.
And so how ought we to describe and think about these two tracks of
s 12? How might the judicial lexicon for s 12 claims be refined to reflect this
important distinction?
The methods track is concerned with whether a particular form of
treatment or punishment is intrinsically cruel and unusual. In the language
used in the governing case law to describe the wrong that s 12 is meant to
address, such methods are per se abhorrent, incompatible with human
dignity,17 and outrage standards of decency.18 The question for a court when
a s 12 claim is made on this track is whether this particular form of sanction
is, in its nature, one that the state may permissibly employ. Determining
whether a given method is inherently objectionable in this manner will often
require looking carefully at the effects of the punishment, in addition to
(and informing) broader reflection on absolute normative standards.19
Crucially, though, this is not an issue of proportionality between the
sanction, on the one hand, and the gravity of the offence and degree of
responsibility of the offender, on the other, nor does an assessment on this
Bacon v. Surrey Pre-trial Services Centre, [2010] B.C.J. No. 1080, 2010 BCSC 805, at
para. 300 (B.C.S.C.) [Bacon].
17

18

Bacon, id., at para. 301; Smith, supra, note 5 at 1072.

While section 12 was not directly engaged in United States v Burns, 2001 SCC 7 (except
as a value to be considered in the s 7 balance), the decision is instructive on what an
examination of effects and reflection on normative standards involves. To decide whether
the government can extradite individuals to places where they may face the death penalty,
the court noted that the problem is not only that capital punishment is inherently
objectionable. The court also analyzed the range of effects that flow from the institution of
capital punishment, including the unique psychological impact of being held for long
periods in the harsh conditions of death row (known as the “death row phenomenon”). At
para. 122: “The finality of the death penalty, combined with the determination of the
criminal justice system to try to satisfy itself that the conviction is not wrongful,
inevitably produces lengthy delays, and the associated psychological trauma to death row
inhabitants, many of whom may ultimately be shown to be innocent.”
19
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track depend on comparing or calibrating the treatment or punishment at
issue to an alternative, lesser sanction. The method of treatment is being
challenged as, in its very nature, constitutionally offensive. This track would
apply to s 12 challenges to capital punishment, corporal sanctions, and some
forms of confinement.
The severity track asks whether the extent of the use of a particular
treatment or punishment renders it cruel and unusual. On this track it is
the extent or amount — not the kind — of punishment or treatment that
might be intolerable, incompatible with human dignity, or an outrage to
standards of decency. The question a court must ask when assessing a claim
on this track is whether the severity of the punishment or treatment being
challenged is grossly disproportionate, when compared to a fit or
appropriate sanction.20 In answering this question, a court is interested in
the relationship to a particular (or reasonable hypothetical) offender’s
wrongdoing, culpability, and circumstances, and the degree to which the
challenged treatment or punishment is out of proper calibration with those
factors.21 We will argue that the effects of a punishment will also matter
here, insofar as they inform an assessment of severity and proportionality.22
This is the form of analysis that our courts have developed through the
mandatory minimum sentence jurisprudence.23 Note that, on the severity
track, the method of punishment employed is assumed to be acceptable, at
least in some measure — the method (for example, incarceration in Nur, or
fines in Boudreault) is not per se offensive. For this reason, the two tracks
have a logically sequential relationship: where both are at issue, a court
R. v. Safarzadeh-Markhali, [2016] S.C.J. No. 14, 2016 SCC 14, at para. 71(S.C.C.),
resolved that the Charter protects against grossly disproportionate punishment only.
Proportionality is a fundamental principle of sentencing, but it does not have
constitutional status as a stand-alone principle of fundamental justice.
20

The full list of relevant factors has been stated often in the cases: the gravity of the
offence, the personal characteristics of the offender, the particular circumstances of the
case, the actual effect of the treatment or punishment on the individual, relevant
penological goals and sentencing principles, the existence of valid alternatives to the
treatment or punishment imposed, and a comparison of punishments imposed for other
crimes in the same jurisdiction. See eg Smith, supra, note 5 at 1073; Morrissey, supra,
note 5, at para. 28.
21

Boudreault is, indeed, a good example of the way that effects of a sentence may inform
an assessment on the severity track.
22

See Nur, supra, note 2, in which the Court asks whether the statutorily-imposed
minimum carceral term is “grossly disproportionate to the punishment that is
appropriate, having regard to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the
offender.”
23
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must first resolve the question of whether there is a constitutional problem
with the method of punishment or treatment before switching to the
severity track.24
In the United States, for historical and institutional reasons, the
methods track is well-developed under Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.
This is largely because the US federal system and many states continue to
rely on the death penalty. While the U.S. Supreme Court has declined the
opportunity to abolish capital punishment as a matter of constitutional law,
it has articulated a complex jurisprudence that narrows and restrains the
institution of capital punishment. As Rachel Barkow observes, the idea that
“death is different” has been used to justify a separate jurisprudence for the
penalty of death: the Court will scrutinize whether the penalty of death is
proportionate to the crime and the defendant, exempting certain crimes and
certain offenders from a capital sentence.25 In noncapital cases, in contrast:
“the Court has done virtually nothing to ensure that the sentence is
appropriate.”26 Barkow laments the near-absence of proportionality review
– the other track – in Eighth Amendment law.
The opposite situation is present in Canada. The methods track has
received little attention in Canadian law, largely because the death penalty
for all non-military offences was abolished by Parliament in 1976. In
response to the proliferation of mandatory minimum sentences in the early
2000s, Canadian courts and scholars have instead focussed on issues of
severity and proportionality. But the failure to acknowledge and develop
the methods track has left critical facets of state punishment unexamined
through the lens of s 12. Of particular interest in this piece, as Debra Parkes
observed in 2014, section 12 has had “relatively little application in relation
to prison conditions”.27 As Canadian courts increasingly hear arguments
under s 12 that reach beyond conventional challenges to mandatory termof-years prison sentences, including cases like Boudreault and claims
In cases challenging the amount of a fine (Boudreault) or the length of a prison
sentence (Lloyd, Nur), the reality is that the analysis need only proceed on the severity
track alone. Fines and imprisonment are the paradigmatic methods of punishment in
contemporary society. The norms of acceptable punishment will evolve over time, but
there is no doubt that neither fines nor imprisonment will be considered inherently
objectionable by a contemporary Canadian court.
24

Rachel Barkow, ‘The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity” (2009) 107:7 Mich. L. Rev. 1145
[hereinafter “Barkow”].
25

26

Id., at 1146.

27

Parkes, supra, note 6 at 605.
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concerning prison conditions, it is crucial that Canadian courts
acknowledge and breathe life into this important distinction. We therefore
now turn to explain why, as a practical matter of sound constitutional
analysis, drawing this distinction matters so very much.
2.

Why the Distinction Matters

Clearly understanding and insisting on drawing the distinction
between the two tracks of s 12 matters because running them together
creates the risk that s 12 claims will fail as a result of analytic confusion,
rather than for principled reasons. Blurring the two tracks can make it more
difficult for a s 12 claim — on either track — to succeed, and for reasons that
are not linked to the fundamental purpose of the right. There are two
problematic effects at work here, both distortions in reasoning that are
produced by judges searching for the answer to the wrong kind of question.
First, if a judge hunts for an abhorrent method of punishment in a case that
is really about a grossly disproportionate use of an otherwise legitimate
method, she may become insensitive to the relevant wrong. Portions of Côté
J’s dissenting opinion in Boudreault suggest this kind of error. Second, if a
judge treats a case about per se intolerable methods as a severity case, she
may begin to engage in inapt comparisons and measuring, seeking to
answer a proportionality question that is simply not posed. Doing so not
only raises the risk of misdirected analysis — it may set up bad incentives
for prison officials. We expand on these two analytic risks below.
(a)

Treating severity cases like methods cases makes the
wrong difficult to locate

The first distortion arises when a judge allows questions and
standards appropriate to the methods track to blur into cases that are
properly about severity alone. When this occurs a judge may unfairly reject
a plaintiff’s claim about gross disproportionality because the method of
punishment is generally acceptable. Hunting for the kinds of wrongs
associated with intrinsically intolerable methods of treatment or
punishment and not finding them, the case for a breach of s 12 can seem
weaker than it ought to if the focus remains fixed where it should lie in a
severity case: on the proportionality of the (otherwise acceptable)
punishment.
Aspects of the dissenting opinion in R. v. Boudreault illustrate
exactly this problem. At the heart of Côté J.’s dissent is a view that the
impugned mandatory victim surcharge at issue in the case – $100 for a
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summary offence, $200 for indictable – was “not exorbitant”.28 Most
Canadians, she observes, would not find payment to be “particularly
onerous”.29 On their own, these observations could tuck comfortably into a
proportionality analysis appropriate to a case on the severity track: they
might simply inform an assessment of the severity of the punishment, a step
along the way to assessing whether it is grossly disproportionate. And,
indeed, much of Justice Côté’s reasons engage with these questions of
proportionality, informed by the test established in Nur. In this dimension
of her judgment, her key points of difference with the majority judgment
arise from the kinds of burdens and deprivations each are willing to
consider as forming part of the “punishment” under constitutional review.
In the portion of her analysis focussed on proportionality, Justice Côté
points to certain features that ameliorate the severity of the scheme,
including that offenders who are unable to pay are entitled to an extension
of time to pay,30 are not to be imprisoned if they default due to poverty,31
and will only rarely be deprived of liberty where necessary to compel
attendance at a committal hearing.32
But there is something else going on in Justice Côté’s judgment and
shaping her view of the case. When she arrives at the end of her analysis
she summarizes her assessment by comparing the victim fine surcharge to
custodial sentences and, crucially, to forms of treatment and punishment
that will always violate section 12: “the lash, the lobotomisation of certain
dangerous offenders, and the castration of sexual offenders”.33 Those
comparisons in mind, she concludes as follows: “my view is that the
requirement that all offenders pay a surcharge of only $100 or $200 per
offence — a surcharge which cannot be enforced against the liberty or
property of an offender who is simply too poor to pay — does not rise to this
level.”34 And of course she is right: a fine pales in comparison to these
abhorrent corporal sanctions. But this is the wrong kind of comparison for
28

Boudreault, supra, note 3, at para. 137.

29

Id., at para. 137.

30

Id., at para. 117 and 143.

31

Id., at para. 120.

32

Id., at para. 163.

Id., at at para. 183. As noted earlier in this article, Justice Côté’s citation traces back to
the 1987 Smith decision. See Smith, supra, note 5, at 1073-74.
33

34Boudreault,

supra, note 3 at para. 183.
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the severity track. On this track a court is concerned with the relationship
between the challenged treatment or punishment and a sanction that would
be a fit response to the hypothetical offender’s wrongdoing, culpability, and
circumstances. Reaching for a comparison to per se unconstitutional
methods of punishment overwhelms the proper inquiry, introducing
analytic noise that makes it difficult to detect the wrong at issue in the case.
Justice Côté’s examples are from a track of s 12 jurisprudence that should
have little application in a case concerned with excessive levels of an
otherwise legitimate form of sanction. In this way, failure to distinguish the
two tracks leads to an excessively narrow understanding of the harm that
section 12 prohibits.
Perhaps part of what made Boudreault difficult to categorize is that,
unlike the typical case on the severity track, there is no particular offence to
ground the analysis. In Nur, the analysis of proportionality directed the
court to grapple with the offence of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm.
In Lloyd, the court had to grapple with the offence of possessing controlled
substances for the purpose of trafficking. There is no such analysis of a
particular offence in Boudreault, due to the odd design of the provision. The
amounts of either $100 or $200 that judges had to impose were not
connected to a particular offence, but only to whether the offender
committed a summary or indictable offence. This feature is part of why the
provision was so uniquely unable to ensure proportionality between the
nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. This feature
posed challenges for both Justice Côté and the majority, but the majority’s
analysis stays firmly on the severity track.
Justice Martin shows that the surcharge becomes abhorrent when
you see that it will be an unpayable and indefinite burden for the highly
marginalized offenders who appear with “staggering regularity in our
provincial courts”.35 As Martin J. explains, “the effects of the same
surcharge will be experienced differently by those who are differently
situated”.36 The central problem is that sentencing judges had no ability
under the challenged provision to address the disproportionate financial
consequences that the fines would deliver to the indigent, regardless of their
moral culpability. Unable to pay, poor offenders subject to the fine had to
live with the threat of detention in relation to ongoing court appearances
and the administrative hassle of committal hearings. Sentencing judges had
35

Boudreault, supra, note 3 at para. 55.

Id., at para. 66. As James Foord put it in his oral argument for appellant Garrett
Eckstein at the Supreme Court: “This case is all about context, if it’s not about context
then it’s only 100 bucks. Green fees.”
36
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no ability to craft a sentence in light of applicable legislative principles, such
as proportionality, rehabilitation, and Gladue factors.37 All of this adds up,
Martin J. reasons, to a breach of s 12 because of a problem of too much
punishment for at least a subset of offenders.
The majority could have responded to Côté J’s reference to the
corporal, bodily sanctions that will always violate s 12 by observing that
Boudreault is a case on the severity track. Justice Côté’s move at this point
in her reasons jumped the tracks, wrongly treating as relevant the question
of whether a fine is as intrinsically offensive to human dignity and per se
abhorrent to community standards as the lash and lobotomization. This is
a distorting move because, of course, a fine is a highly legitimate form of
sanction in general. The issue was whether the victim surcharge could be
grossly disproportionate, or too severe, in at least some cases, having regard
to the nature of the offence and the circumstances of the offender. Justice
Côté invoked the standard from the methods track and, in so doing,
arguably made it harder to locate the wrong that was actually at issue. The
risk of analytical distortion this presents is one reason it is time to clearly
recognize that s 12 of the Charter covers two distinct tracks and to ask judges
to be assiduous in distinguishing the analysis appropriate to each.
(b)

Treating methods cases like severity invites inapt
comparisons and measuring

The second distortion appears when, in a case properly on the
methods track, a judge allows severity reasoning to seep into the analysis.
When this occurs, a judge casts out looking for a standard against which to
measure the proportionality of the impugned punishment or treatment
when, in fact, the court is being called upon to decide whether the nature
and effects of the penal method are such that it is constitutionally
unavailable to the state. The comparative pole that the judge reaches for in
assessing proportionality might be the offender’s wrongdoing, culpability,
and circumstances, or it might be other existing penal methods. And of
course such comparison might play some role in informing an assessment
of whether a given method is intrinsically beyond the normative pale — such
comparison might help to illuminate societal standards. But, unlike severity
analysis, on the method track proportionality assessments do not answer
the question posed. Indeed, they can be badly misleading. Very simply, the
blurring of the two tracks in this direction can lead a judge to answer the
wrong question.
37

Boudreault, supra, note 3, at paras. 81-83.
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Consider the question of the constitutionality of section 745.51 of the
Criminal Code, which introduced the possibility of consecutive periods of
parole ineligibility for multiple convictions for murder. These “stacked”
parole ineligibility periods can lead to sentences that amount to life
imprisonment without parole — so-called “whole life sentences.” Analyzed
using assessments of proportionality drawn from the severity track, a s 12
challenge to this provision would have little hope of success. Employing the
framework developed in the mandatory minimum sentence cases, a judge
would ultimately ask whether the possibility of a whole life sentence is
grossly disproportionate to the harm caused by the offences and the degree
of responsibility and circumstances of the offender. By that metric, the
challenge would be consigned to fail; indeed, s 745.51 might help to generate
a scheme of greater proportionality, given our existing sentencing
framework. As Justice Campbell explained in just such a constitutional
challenge to this provision, multiple murders “cause greater harm, with
greater moral culpability, than cases involving but a single murder, and
therefore are often deserving of greater punishment.”38
But the comparison is inapt because the real complaint about s
745.51 is a concern about methods. Whether such sentences are
proportional or not, the gravamen of the s 12 concern about this section is
that there is something intrinsically abhorrent about consigning a person to
die in prison, stripping them of any hope of future liberty. For this reason,
and though he did not draw the sharp distinction that we urge here,
Campbell J was right, in Granados-Arana, to move past the question of
proportionality and to also ask the fundamental question on the methods
track: whether this provision, which allows the possibility of a life sentence
without parole eligibility, “demean[s] or violate[s] human dignity in
violation of s. 12 of the Charter.”39 Although we might quarrel with his
conclusion that it does not, and in particular with his view that the royal
prerogative of mercy is sufficient to stave off those unconstitutional effects,
this is the right question. In cases on the methods track, questions of
proportionality, of the existence of discretion and safety-valves,40 and
38

R v Granados-Arana, 2017 ONSC 6785 at para 141 [Granados-Arana].

39

Granados-Arana at para 142. Campbell J

In Granados-Arana, id., at para 143, Campbell J lays heavy emphasis on the fact that s
745.51 is a discretionary provision and, as such, “where such a consecutive parole
ineligibility period order would be excessive, grossly disproportionate, or otherwise
inappropriate, the sentencing judge can simply order the parole ineligibility periods to be
served concurrently.” In this, he falls back into thinking drawn from the severity track. If
the method is inherently violative of s 12, it can never lie in the hands of the state.
40
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comparisons with harms and culpability all distract from that essential
focus: whether this is a penal method that is per se objectionable. That must
be the analytic focus in any future challenges to this provision.
Another form of inapt comparison resulting from treating methods
cases like severity cases arises from an example that draws us closer to the
focus of the next section of this paper: solitary confinement. The example
is an Ontario Court of Appeal decision on the constitutionality of prison
conditions experienced at Maplehurst Correctional Complex.41 In this case,
Laskin JA attempted to measure the proportionality of an impugned
punishment in a case that was really a complaint about an unacceptable
penal method. Once again, a blurring of the tracks makes a s 12 challenge
more difficult to prove, for reasons unlinked to the underlying wrongs that
the section seeks to avoid.
During two years of pretrial detention at Maplehurst, Jamil
Ogiamien and Huy Nguyen were often held in lockdowns: confined to their
cells for most of the day and night for several months. The application judge
held that the lockdowns violated s 12, and awarded Charter damages in the
amount of $60,000 and $25,000 to Ogiamien and Nguyen, respectively.42
In overturning that decision, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the
frequency and duration of these lockdowns, which it said were caused
largely by staff shortages, did not violate s 12.
The litigants in Ogiemien did not ask the court to distinguish
between the two tracks in the way we do here, but this case was clearly a
complaint about the method of state treatment. Indeed, as remanded
prisoners, Ogiamien and Nguyen did not even stand convicted of an offence.
As such, they were not in a position to allege a lack of proportionality
between the punishment or treatment they experienced when compared to
a fit or appropriate sanction. Still, the Ogiemien court used the severity lens
to analyze the complaint. And since there was no convicted offence to
ground the analysis, the court thought it had to first decide what were
‘proportionate’ or ‘ordinary’ prison conditions. Rather than asking whether
extensive lockdown is a constitutionally available method of state treatment
in pretrial facilities in contemporary Canada, it asked whether the
lockdowns departed from a norm.
Justice Laskin said there is a two-step process to determine whether
treatment is cruel and unusual:
Ogiamien v. Ontario (Community Safety and Correctional Services), [2017] O.J. No.
4401, 2017 ONCA 667 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 10 [ “Ogiamien Ont CA”].
41

Ogiamien v. Ontario, [2016] O.J. No. 2444, 2016 ONSC 3080 (Ont. S.C.J.) [hereinafter
“Ogiamien Ont SCJ”].
42

- 13 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3466354

Not a final version – Forthcoming (2019) in The Supreme Court Law Review (2d)

The first step establishes a benchmark. In this case step one looks at
the treatment of [the inmates] under “appropriate” prison conditions
– that is their treatment under ordinary conditions in the remand
units when there were no lockdowns. Step two assesses the extent of
the departure from the benchmark. In this case step two looks at the
effect of the lockdowns on [the inmates’] treatment. If the effect of
the lockdowns resulted in treatment that was grossly
disproportionate to their treatment under ordinary conditions then
their s.12 rights would be violated.43
Justice Laskin continued by noting that ordinary prison conditions at
Maplehurst, absent lockdowns, allow inmates 6 hours of daily access to the
dayroom to socialize, shower, watch television, read and make telephone
calls. Inmates can also access an exercise yard for 20-30 minutes each day,
participate in programming and receive visits. In 2014, lockdowns occurred
for about 50% of the time in 2014, and 55% in 2015, but Laskin J.A.
emphasized that the lockdowns that affected Ogiamien and Nguyen directly
were slightly less than that, averaging 20-30% of the time from 2014-2016.
Approximately 1/3 of those lockdowns affected them for only part of the
day. For the other 2/3, they were confined to their cells for 24 hours per day,
in a small cell with another person. The court accepted their evidence that a
lockdown involved stress, no stimuli, no exercise, no family visits, no
telephone, no clean linen, and no access to programming.44 Ultimately, the
court concluded that “[t]he treatment of Ogiamien and Nguyen under
lockdowns compared to their treatment under ordinary conditions may
have been excessive or disproportionate, but it was not grossly
disproportionate. Thus their treatment did not meet the high bar required
to establish a s.12 violation.”45
We don’t argue that Ogiamien appeal was rightly or wrongly decided
(there were several more issues before the court that we don’t discuss here).
Rather, we want to emphasize that the legal framework developed in the
mandatory minimum context is a poor fit for resolving a complaint about
extensive periods of cellular confinement in a pretrial facility. The inmates
in Ogiamien raised a complaint about intolerable methods. By treating that
43

Ogiamien Ont CA, supra, note 41 at para. 10.

Id., at para 42. Both inmates said that staff tried to maintain access to essential
services, including medical and lawyer visits. Showers were inconsistently available
during lockdowns.
44

45

Ogiamien Ont CA., supra note 41 at para. 57.
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complaint like a severity case, Laskin JA tried to answer a proportionality
question that was simply not posed. The lens of ‘gross disproportionality’
does not help to resolve a complaint brought by remanded inmates about
conditions of confinement. The complaint is not about excessive responses
to wrongdoing but about penal methods alleged to be, in their nature,
objectionable.
Along with the risk of misdirected analysis, this approach may set up
bad incentives for prison officials. Notice how Laskin JA tries to compare
‘ordinary’ prison conditions with the impugned conditions, in order to
satisfy the comparative demand inherent in the gross disproportionality
analysis. Prison officials will soon realize that ensuring austere norms as
part of ordinary conditions will help to protect against successful
complaints asserting deviation from the norm. If we handle prison
condition cases by comparing impugned treatment to ‘ordinary’ conditions
in a particular institution, institutions can avoid constitutional review by
ratcheting down general standards.46 Prisons and jails could simply work to
ensure that ordinary conditions are austere and punitive in order to put a
finger on the comparative scales. Consider Ogiamien: What if ‘ordinary’
conditions at Maplehurst involved leaving a cell just once per week so as to
access a brief shower? If lockdowns result in the loss of that minimal weekly
reprieve from extreme solitary, would we say there is no constitutional
problem because the new treatment is not a significant deviation from an
established norm?47 Let us say more about the need to distinguish these two
tracks and properly apply the method track in the context of ongoing cases
challenging the constitutionality of solitary confinement.
3.

How the Methods Track Applies to Solitary Confinement

This is the same incentives problem that arises under Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472
(1995), in which the U.S. Supreme Court holds that inmates only have a liberty interest
protected by the Due Process clause when a prison regulation “imposes atypical and
significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life”.
Austere hardships across the board can work to dilute or extinguish Due Process
protections for incarcerated people.
46

At the very least, the comparison should not be to ‘ordinary’ prison conditions in the
institution under consideration. The application judge in Ogiamien Ont SCJ, supra, note
42, referred extensively to the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
(the Mandela Rules), at paras. 211-215, as an “aid in interpreting the rights conferred by
the Charter”. (Thanks to Anthony Sangiuliano for offering this point.)
47
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The Ogiamien approach is followed, to a degree, in Canadian Civil
Liberties Association v. Canada (Attorney General).48 The CCLA case was
a constitutional challenge to the federal legislative provisions that authorize
“administrative segregation”, otherwise known as solitary confinement and
defined as the practice of locking inmates in cells for 22 or more hours a
day, indefinitely.49 In one part of her judgment on the constitutionality of
these provisions, Justice Benotto says that s 12 requires her to compare
solitary to conditions in general population. Drawn to precedents like
Ogiamien that blur the two tracks, Justice Benotto writes that “a proper
comparative exercise must consider the effects of prolonged administrative
segregation against incarceration in an ordinary prison range”.50
In the crucial part of her analysis, however, Justice Benotto is clear
that solitary violates s 12 because of its harmful effects – because placement
in a cell for most of the day and night exposes inmates to a risk of “severe
and often enduring negative health consequences”.51 Her analysis is not
comparative in substance. There is no discussion of the particular
conditions or health effects that flow from ordinary maximum-security
confinement.
In a move that helps to free her analysis from comparisons to
ordinary imprisonment, Justice Benotto cites Toure v. Canada (Public
Safety & Emergency Preparedness), in which LaForme JA rejects an
argument that judges must strictly follow a two-step comparative
proportionality test in what is effectively a complaint about a penal method.
52 In the context of indefinite and prolonged immigration detention,
LaForme JA reminds us that s 12 claims involving penal methods must be
Canadian Civil Liberties Association v. Canada (Attorney General), [2019] O.J. No.
1537, 2019 ONCA 243 (Ont. C.A.) [ “CCLA”]. The Supreme Court of Canada has been
asked to adjudicate an appeal of the CCLA decision, which will likely be paired with an
appeal of the BC decision declaring the law that governs solitary to be unconstitutional:
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 BCCA
228. [BCCLA]
48

See sections 31-37 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, SC 1992, c 20,
which have been amended in the wake of CCLA and BCCLA decisions.
49

50

CCLA, supra, note 48, at para. 97

51

Id., at para. 97.

Toure v. Canada (Public Safety & Emergency Preparedness), [2018] O.J. No. 4230,
2018 ONCA 681 (Ont. C.A.). at para. 57, dismissing an argument that the judge below
failed to strictly ask: (1) what treatment would have been appropriate, and (2) measure
the actual treatment against this benchmark.
52
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analyzed primarily by looking at the nature and effects of the state treatment
at issue. As he puts it: “a determination of whether treatment is cruel and
unusual requires a focus on the effect of the conduct in question – does it
give rise to cruel and unusual treatment?”53
Like Justice Lamer in Smith, Justice LaForme is attuned to how a
sanction might, in its nature, offend our sense of decency and thus violate
limits on state action in the penal realm. Justice LaForme reminds us that
it is often the effects of a punishment that will disclose whether a given
method is inherently objectionable, and this is precisely the approach that
the solitary confinement cases require. Beneath the surface of her citation
to Ogiamien, that is the approach Justice Benotto takes in CCLA. Her
opinion is not, in fact, predicated on a view that solitary is a problem
because it departs from ordinary prison conditions. Rather, she points to
the powerful findings of the application judge on these issues, showing that
the problem with solitary is that it causes foreseeable and expected harm
when it extends beyond 15 days.54 The substance of Justice Benotto’s
approach accords with that required for a case on the methods track.55
To return to the distinction we are pressing in this article, it is clear
that the problem with solitary is not a lack of proportionality with the nature
of an offence or the circumstances of an offender, nor is it a problem with
the degree of departure from treatment unfolding elsewhere in the prison.
The acceptability of solitary confinement, at least as it has been legislated
and practiced in Canadian prisons and jails in recent decades, is best
revealed by pursuing analysis on the methods track: asking whether it is an

53

Id., at para. 61 (emphasis added).

54

CCLA, supra, note 48 at para. 73.

In British Columbia, the trial judge opted to decide a challenge to the laws authorizing
solitary confinement under s 7 rather than s 12. See the reasoning on this issue set out at
BCCLA, supra, note 48 at paras. 524-534, Justice Leask appeared to accept the
government’s argument that s 12 fundamentally requires an individual analysis, and that
the absence of a personal plaintiff in that case precluded a sufficient factual record to
determine whether the “conditions, duration and reasons for segregation” of a particular
inmate violate s 12 (at para. 527, citing R v. Marriott, 2014 NSCA 28 at para. 38). In
CCLA, Justice Benotto rejected that same argument, noting that while many cases are
brought by individuals and thus turn on detailed evidence of the treatment they endured,
that does not preclude the application of s 12 to other contexts (supra, note 48, at paras.
94-95). The Supreme Court of Canada is likely to address this issue, along with a number
of related issues regarding the availability of Charter remedies in the context of public
interest litigation arising from both the BC and Ontario solitary appeals.
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unacceptable penal method that outrages our standards of decency. 56
Justice Benotto was convinced that solitary infringes s 12 because of its
negative effects on health, which has been a powerful line of concern about
solitary confinement for many years.57 Others might emphasize that
indefinite solitary in the absence of procedural fairness is what gives rise to
an experience of isolation that violates s 12. The point is that the wrong of
solitary is not disclosed by examining the degree to which it departs from
ordinary prison conditions, whatever those may be.
4.

The Relation Between Prison Conditions and
Proportionality

Our discussion of solitary confinement as a type of case on the
methods track raises an important question that we wish to address before
concluding this article: are prison conditions only relevant to the methods
track of s 12? Otherwise put, are the conditions and effects of imprisonment
ever relevant to a complaint about severity? Our view is that they are. We
have insisted here that the essential question for the severity track —
proportionality — is not a central concern for the methods track, focussed
as it is on the normative evaluation of the lived effects of a given treatment
or punishment. But the converse cannot be said: the effects of an otherwise
acceptable method of imprisonment are indeed relevant when assessing
whether a given punishment is grossly disproportionate, in violation of s 12.
This position follows naturally from an argument that we have each
advanced versions of elsewhere, namely that the qualitative features,
consequences, and experience of incarceration — not just the quantitative
issue of duration — must be considered when assessing the individualized

See, for example, the discussion in R v Prystay, 2019 ABQB 8, which awards a
significant sentencing discount in recognition of time spent in pretrial segregation.
“Societal views on what is acceptable treatment or punishment evolve over time. Forced
sterilization, residential schools, lobotomies to treat mental disorders, corporal
punishment in schools and the death penalty are all examples of treatment once
considered acceptable. Segregation ravages the body and the mind. There is growing
discomfort over its continued use as a quick solution to complex problems.” (para. 128)
56

This line of concern is particularly prevalent when it comes to isolating mentally ill
inmates. David Fathi, director of the ACLU National Prison Project, says that a rule
against placing the seriously mentally ill in solitary is no longer in dispute under
American law: every federal court to consider the question has held that supermax-style
confinement of the seriously mentally ill is unconstitutional. David C Fathi, “The
Common Law of Supermax Litigation” (2004) 24:2 Pace L Rev 675 at 681-84.
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circumstances of the offender and the true gravity of a given sanction.58 If
it is true that prison conditions and their individualized impact on an
offender help us understand the severity of a sentence and, with this, the
proportionality of the punishment, they must also be relevant to evaluations
of gross disproportionality under the s 12 severity track.
The recent decision in R. v. Sharma is one powerful illustration of
how prison conditions can impact a case on the severity track.59 In Sharma
Justice Hill strikes down the mandatory minimum penalty of two years for
importing cocaine under s. 6(3)(a.1) of the Controlled Drugs and
Substances Act, on the basis of gross disproportionality. 60 In the course of
his analysis, he points to several concerns about the impact of penitentiary
confinement on some offenders, including those with pre-existing health
problems,61 those who will be incarcerated far from home,62 and Indigenous
people who experience disproportionate burdens of incarceration.63 Justice
Hill is clear that the lens of ‘gross disproportionality’ under section 12
requires judges to consider more than the length of sentence alone: “the s.
12 Charter protection is not confined to one-dimensional focus upon
sentence duration but rather the quality and effect of the punishment on the
offender including the nature and conditions under which it is applied.”64
In this respect, Sharma draws from Smith. As we discuss above,
Smith makes clear that the nature or quality of punishment can be grounds
for finding a section 12 breach. Smith was a challenge to a mandatory length
of confinement of seven years for a broadly defined drug trafficking offence.
This case is clearly on the severity track, but in his majority reasons Lamer
J. said that when analyzing whether a sanction will be grossly
disproportionate, courts should consider not only length but also the effect
See Benjamin L. Berger, “Sentencing and the Salience of Pain and Hope,” (2015) 70
S.C.L.R. (2d) 337; and Dwight Newman & Malcolm Thorburn, eds.,The Dignity of Law:
The Legacy of Justice Louis LeBel, (Markham, ON: LexisNexis, 2015); Lisa Kerr "How
the Prison is a Black Box in Punishment Theory" (2019) 69:1 University of Toronto L.J.
85; Lisa Kerr, "Sentencing Ashley Smith: How Prison Conditions Relate to the Aims of
Punishment" (2017) 32:2 C.J.L.S. 187.
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[2018] O.J. No. 909, 2018 ONSC 1141 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Sharma].
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S.C. 1996, c. 19.
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Sharma, supra note 59 at paras. 216-220.

62

Id., at para. 121.
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Id., at paras. 121-123.

64

Id., at para. 146.
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and conditions of a sentence. He noted that the “effect of the sentence is
often a composite of many factors”; that it is “not limited to the quantum or
duration of the sentence but includes its nature and the conditions under
which it is applied”.65 Justice Lamer describes a hypothetical scenario to
show how decisions made in the correctional context may combine to create
an unacceptably severe sentence:
Sometimes by its length alone or by its very nature will the sentence
be grossly disproportionate to the purpose sought. Sometimes it will
be the result of the combination of factors which, when considered
in isolation, would not in and of themselves amount to gross
disproportionality. For example, twenty years for a first offence
against property would be grossly disproportionate, but so would
three months of imprisonment if the prison authorities decide it
should be served in solitary confinement.66
This passage from Smith suggests that a sentence may become grossly
disproportionate in light of the conditions experienced by an offender.
Justice Lamer’s obiter suggestion has not received much attention, but it
serves as an example of how penal treatment might inform a complaint on
the severity track. His use of the example of solitary confinement is
particularly instructive for purposes of this piece. The effects of certain
prison conditions might be the basis for a claim that the treatment at issues
is inherently abhorrent and that the state may never use it. But even in the
absence of a finding that the method is per se impermissible, taking account
of those same effects might render the punishment excessive to the point of
gross disproportionality. As in Sharma, and when it comes to a penal
method that will never be ruled inherently cruel and unusual —
incarceration, the implication is important and provocative: the actual
effects and conditions of imprisonment are relevant to s 12, no matter the
track.
Conclusion
The wrong that s 12 is ultimately concerned with is the same under
both tracks: treatment or punishment that is abhorrent or intolerable,
offends standards of decency, or violates human dignity. While the end
point is the same, we have argued here that complaints about penal methods
65

Smith, supra, note 5 at 1073.

66

Id., at 1073.
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require a specific analytical approach, distinct from that employed to assess
the proportionality of an otherwise acceptable kind of punishment.
It may be helpful to conclude by returning to Justice McIntyre’s rich
dissenting opinion
in Smith, which offers clarifying historical perspective. McIntyre J reminds
us that the two tracks emerged at different points in our legal history.
Originally, he writes, the prohibition against cruel and unusual treatment or
punishment was aimed at “punishments which by their nature and character
were inherently cruel.”67 Here one can imagine the medieval punishment of
drawing and quartering in the town square, or, today, the sensory and social
deprivation that inheres in many forms of solitary confinement. The limit on
cruel and unusual punishment has since been extended, McIntyre J writes, to
punishments which, though not inherently cruel, are “so disproportionate to
the offence committed that they become cruel and unusual.”68 Punishment
that is not per se cruel and unusual, “may become cruel and unusual due to
excess or lack of proportionality.”69 Examples from our jurisprudence include
the large fines imposed on indigent offenders for minor wrongdoing in
Boudreault, or seven-years imprisonment for a first-time importer of a single
marijuana cigarette in Smith. Justice McIntyre disagreed with the majority
on whether the latter violated s 12, and on that front his views have been
clearly rejected in the subsequent jurisprudence. But his careful attention to
the distinct paths of s 12 is what we have sought to recover in this article. If
our goal is to draw meaningful limits on state punishment that are responsive
to the realities of our practices of punishment, courts should recognize and
embrace this distinction and its analytic consequences.

Smith, supra note 5, at para 85, citing Miller and Cockriell, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 680, R. v.
Shand (1976), 1976 CanLII 600 (ON CA), 30 C.C.C. (2d) 23 (Ont. C.A.); Re Mitchell and
The Queen, supra; Re Moore and The Queen, supra; Re Konechny (1983), 1983 CanLII 282
(BC CA), 10 C.C.C. (3d) 233 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Langevin (1984), 1984 CanLII 1914 (ON
CA), 11 C.C.C. (3d) 336 (Ont. C.A.), and the American cases; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (plurality opinion); People v. Broadie, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471 (1975); Carmona v.
Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2nd Cir. 1978); and Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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